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OPERATION ALLIED FORCE
A THEORETICAL REVIEW OF DOCTRINE & AIRPOWER

by

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Maritime Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

In March of 1999, NATO engaged in Operation Allied Force (OAF), an operation widely touted by military and political leaders as successful. However, the means used and the expected duration required, in achieving "the victory" provides many operational art learning points. Moreover, the strategy implemented caused many top US officials, during the first weeks of the campaign, to doubt any victory without a significant adjustment in strategy.

This paper provides an analytical review of the doctrine, objectives, and strategy used in the Kosovo conflict and summarizes some of the ramifications. Furthermore, there are significant issues concerning the use of air power to win a conflict that includes military doctrine, centers of gravity, decisive force, legality, and force structure for future operations and budgets. The "four questions" from operational art concerning the ends, ways, means, and risk provide a framework to evaluate the appropriateness of the planning and execution for this conflict. An examination of the operational art aspects indicates that planning and strategy were flawed at the strategic and operational level due mostly to political constraints and limitations with the selected course of action. Finally, recommendations for avoiding similar shortfalls are outlined, including recommendations for future force structure and employment requirements.

"The US and NATO entered this conflict without a sound strategy and now they're paying for it," says retired Air Force General Matthew Higgins. "When you fight a war for political reasons, without a sound military Plan you end up with a conflict you can't win."¹

The United States is moving to redefine its policy in Kosovo. The immediate reason can be found in the deteriorating situation on the ground. Last week, violence intensified between ethnic Albanians and Serbs; this was not something that the United States bargained for when it intervened last year. For this and a host of other reasons, it appears that Washington is now in the process of redefining its role and quite possibly preparing to withdraw its forces.²

Introduction

In March of 1999, NATO engaged in the largest combat operation in its history by engaging Serbian forces around the region of Serbia and Kosovo.³ The operation dubbed Operation Allied Force (OAF) is widely touted by military and political leaders as successful.⁴ However, the means used, and the expected duration required, in achieving "the victory" is worthy of academic scrutiny. This is particularly important because the miscalculations before, during, and after hostilities were immense with potential impact upon future US military employment and planning. The strategy implemented caused many top US officials, during the first weeks of the campaign, to doubt any victory without a significant adjustment in strategy.⁵

Success is generally judged by the ability to achieve stated objectives. NATO and political leaders changed objectives during the course of hostilities, and that is normally not a good sign.⁶ This paper provides an analytical review of the doctrine, objectives, and strategy used in the Kosovo conflict and summarizes some of the ramifications. Furthermore, there are significant issues concerning the use of air power to win a conflict that includes military doctrine, centers of gravity, decisive force, legality, and force structure for future operations and budgets. All of these factors are

instrumental in achieving future objectives and subsequent success. The swarm of criticism concerning OAF makes researching the method for success critical.

The strategy employed for OAF highlights a growing trend toward the use of air-and-missile forces as the best instrument of power when military force is required. The Gulf War entailed a more conventional approach to military employment by relying heavily upon air power to prepare the battle space and subsequently transitioning to ground operations to secure objectives. Increasingly though, in Bosnia, Iraq, and Yugoslavia, air-and-missile weapons are used independently to reach strategic objectives. The factors driving this strategy are the subject of much debate and worthy of examination.

The "four questions" from operational art concerning the ends, ways, means, and risk will provide a framework to evaluate the appropriateness of the planning and execution for this conflict. An examination of the operational art aspects of this conflict will: indicate that planning and strategy were flawed at the strategic and operational level and attempt to explain the root causes. Finally, recommendations for avoiding similar shortfalls are outlined, including recommendations for future force structure and employment requirements.

Because US military action is a direct product of politics and subsequent political guidance, it is imperative that military officers and planners understand the underlying doctrine that drives military action and how force is to be applied. Furthermore, a review of the US and NATO strategic objectives will the root cause for misguided military employment.

Doctrine

With the fall of the Soviet Union, NATO and US doctrine is currently undergoing change. The impact being that "the US can no longer depend on containment as a unifying concept."⁷ Colonel John Warden contends that the US no longer faces a win or lose military situation as expected during the Cold War.⁸ With the exception of a North Korean invasion, the US is in a position to choose what wars it will enter. The ramification of selecting conflicts that are not "clearly" vital to US national interests and may lack popular support, places military leaders in a quandary of how best to apply military force. So what drives the use of US and potentially NATO forces? The deciding factors are likely to be complex, as was the case during OAF. Planners and operators need to understand the type of conflict and philosophy driving decisions. When planners are determining a commander's estimate of the situation with a recommended course of action it helps to know if the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine of decisive force is the doctrine, or if some other form of force application is to be instituted.

The **Weinberger-Powell** doctrine introduced in 1984 consists of six basic points: 1) Vital interests need to be at stake, 2) There must be a clear commitment to victory, 3) Political and military objectives have to be clear, 4) The forces must be properly sized, 5) Have a reasonable assurance of public and congressional support prior to intervening, and 6) Force is the last resort. This doctrine served the US well in preventing inappropriate entry in to Central America during the early 1980's and again with appropriate force structure and employment in the Gulf War.⁹ Nevertheless, significant changes in doctrine started with the Clinton Administration.

"... the upcoming Secretary for Defense Aspin came on board criticizing the Weinberger Doctrine as an "all or nothing" approach. He further went on to say that there had to be a limited force approach available. Unfortunately, his "limited force" approach cost him his job when there was not enough force available in Mogadishu, October 1983. One could argue that the entire conception was a misuse of force... Powell even admits this in his book, that he finally gave in and maybe it was a mistake to give in and not include the tanks that were in the heavier equipment, that it was a mistake not to have enough support there."¹⁰

Most of the recent conflicts, with the exception of the Gulf War, have been to separate a tyrant, or a small group of tyrants, from an otherwise friendly and innocent population. This was the case in Grenada, Just Cause, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Grenada and Just Cause used quick, decisive and overwhelming force to a successful end. On the other hand, Somalia did not and is still having an impact on US military doctrine. The success of air power in the Gulf War and the failure in Somalia helped set the stage for limiting the type of force applied in Bosnia, and subsequently Kosovo.

US doctrine affects two aspects of the military establishment, first being the type of conflict entered (planning), and second, how force will be applied (employment). Although President Clinton has said that the United States does not intend to act as the world's policeman, he has set down a "doctrine" that, in effect, calls for military intervention to protect peoples that are being brutalized by their own governments.¹¹ His not-so-clearly-defined doctrine referred to as "humanitarian intervention" has two parts. First is the use of force on behalf of international values, instead of the narrower national interests, for which sovereign states have traditionally fought.¹² Second, in defense of these values, military intervention is used to influence the internal affairs of sovereign states.¹³ The significant impact of this "humanitarian" doctrine is potentially low public support for combat operations. Recognizing this for Kosovo forced the alliance's political leaders to decree that the war be conducted without risk to their

military personnel, thus severely limiting military force options with adverse outcomes.¹⁴

No risk to military personnel is an attempt at limiting political risk, and that is a mistake.

Politicians must take risks when a situation warrants the use of force to create the proper political climate for the military. The NCA has a responsibility to take calculated political risks in order to sell US military involvement to the public; thus allowing the appropriate military options to be exercised to obtain stated objectives. In Kosovo the problem was genocide -- not NATO's credibility as indicated by the Department of State.¹⁵ How many American citizens are going to approve military or civilian casualties and collateral damage over an organization's credibility? Ken Campbell effectively argues that genocide is the single worst crime in international society, and has been since the Genocide Convention of 1948. It is not a war crime -- it is what murder one is to manslaughter.¹⁶ Because genocide is the worst international crime, it differentiates itself from other intrastate human rights violations, and the US should justify its actions as legitimate. This justification should allow the military to use appropriate force for the situation and prevent illegality allegations, as in Kosovo.¹⁷

Although an examination of doctrine at the NCA level may seem to be unimportant to the operational commander, it drove almost every decision made planning and execution decision during OAF. The doctrine discussed can be equated with strategic guidance that must be adhered to when answering the "four questions" concerning military planning. "Without considering the questions of ends, ways, means, and risk up front, there is little or no chance of even the best planned military operation achieving (or helping achieve) the full strategic objective."¹⁸ This is certainly the case in OAF where time and effectiveness were critical and failed.

First Question: What military conditions must be produced in the theater of operations to achieve the strategic goal? (ends)

The strategic goals for Kosovo were to stop the killing, achieve a durable peace that prevents further repression, and provide for democratic self-government for the Kosovar people.¹⁹ These are tough objectives to achieve, if not impossible. To stop the killing is probably the easiest to achieve of the three, and the one that the military is best equipped to handle. As for the other two goals, the biggest concern for the military is that its action might inhibit durable peace or the democratic process from occurring, by improperly conducting operations to stop the killing. Therefore, this analysis will focus on military options to stop the killing while providing for the other two goals.

General Clark's first mission statement indicated that NATO would destroy Milosevic's Army and later changed that to "degrade."²⁰ The thought that air-and-missile weapons could "destroy" a dispersed and heavily camouflaged army is misleading at best. The restructuring of the policy on how to achieve the objectives only helps highlight the poor planning and adopted strategy. The air-and-missile only campaign was incapable of achieving the first objective to stop the killing – it could not do it.

President Clinton has been told that he won't win the war in Kosovo without the use of ground troops. A few weeks ago the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a letter to Defense Secretary William Cohen saying that only ground troops would guarantee fulfillment of the administration's political objectives...but it is still unclear that he [the president] has drawn the obvious conclusion of the Kosovo war: you can't stop a humanitarian outrage from 15,000 feet in the air.²¹

Interestingly, Major Vuono, a Naval War College student, conducted a formal Commander's Estimate of the Situation for Kosovo two months before hostilities started and recommended a ground invasion course of action over **air strikes**, or **supporting**

the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army).²² General Clark apparently knew that ground troops were required but was constrained politically.

Asked if there was any possibility of NATO troops being ordered in, the diplomat admitted that such a plan "is there." "But nobody is rushing to pull it off the shelf. It involves over 200,000 troops." That prospect is said to be favored by NATO military leaders. US General Wesley Clark, supreme commander of the allied forces in Europe, said...that "air power alone cannot stop paramilitary murder on the ground." Clark, did not however suggest that NATO ground forces should move into Yugoslavia -- an option resolutely rejected by western powers, particularly the United States. "As for what else might be done, I'm going to defer that to the political leaders of NATO and NATO's governments," he said.²³

General Clark was clearly in a political/military hot seat, meaning that he knew the proper military course of action to undertake but was unable to act on that course of action. General Clark stated:

"All of us in uniform work for our political leadership. They set the guidelines. They set the limits. They provide the mission and directives to us, and then we execute the policies and missions that we are given. Within that executive, they give us a great deal of latitude to do the job the best way we see available."²⁴

The latitude given did not allow NATO troops in Kosovo until the withdrawal of Serbian troops. Still there was a problem of time in two key respects. First, quick action was required to stop the killing. Second, it takes a long time to get the army into position to strike -- assuming the political leadership will provide for ground troops. But these should have been some of the "what if" discussions being presented to the NCA by the JCS and General Clark.

What if the bombing doesn't work? What next? Do we use ground troops? Are the American people prepared for use of ground troops? If Serb forces begin to massacre ethnic Albanians on a large-scale, and those forces [in Macedonia] are given a green light to go in, will there be enough? It took the coalition in the Persian Gulf six months to build up the kind of forces necessary to deal with Iraq, and you can't build those kinds of forces up in a weekend or in a week or two weeks. But by that time, most of the Albanians can be slaughtered.²⁵

The actions dictated by the civilian leaders do not always make good military sense and have a tendency to frustrate military combat officers, as was the case in the Korean War. The statement below made by General of the Army MacArthur to the

Senate after his recall from Korea sounds very much like a comment General Clark made to the Senate Armed Services Committee.²⁶

The general definition which for many decades has been accepted was that war was the ultimate process of politics; that when all other political means failed, you then go to force; and that when you do that, the balance of control...the minute you reach the killing stage, is the control of the military. A theater commander, in any campaign, is not merely limited to a handling of his troops; he commands that whole area politically, economically, and militarily. You have got to trust at this stage of the game when politics fail, and the military takes over, you must trust the military...²⁷

What a difference 40 years has made on civil-military relations. Unfortunately, political leaders placed their constraints against the advice of military planners and did not allow for any ground invasion. This allowed Milosevic to calculate his risk and execute his own military options virtually unimpeded for weeks. How NATO could potentially stop the killing with air-and-missile power caused great debate among the top NATO leadership.²⁸

"The systematic ethnic cleansing of hundreds of thousands, if not the whole 1.8 million, ethnic Albanians was not something people were anticipating."²⁹

What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition? (ways)

As mentioned, the method of applying force was dictated: no ground troops and targets must meet the approval of all 19 NATO nations.³⁰ Somehow, this plan had to have an effect. The sequence of actions planned and taken was to first announce the plan to the enemy, which was a huge mistake.³¹ The announced plan entailed a couple of days of air strikes to show NATO resolve and use no ground troops. That was the plan. There was no other plan. The desired effect was that Milosevic "comes to his senses" and the war is over.³² Unfortunately, NATO planned a two-day operation and Milosevic had a war plan.³³

There was a miscalculation as to the enemy's capabilities, and that forced NATO to come up with short notice contingency plans, which was to continue the bombing and

increase the magnitude. The initial strikes did not get the desired effect, possibly because of the gradual nature of the strikes and the nature of the targets. The dynamically changing ground picture caused the gradualism more so than any pre-planned execution.³⁴ Anthony Cordesman argues that it is increasingly difficult in modern war to "shock and awe" anyone with decisive air power and that real-world military plans and doctrine are based heavily on "limits and constraints."³⁵ Senator Levin, of the Armed Services Committee, indicates that in the world of coalitions and alliances, decisive force may have to yield to a "maximum achievable force" given all the constraints.³⁶ If this is truly the future, the problem then becomes how to plan for this.

With air-and-missile power dictated and a gradual show of force mandated, operational questions focused on the center of gravity and targets. It is true that bombs and missiles had the capability to strike both strategic and tactical targets. In this case, weather problems combined with collateral damage concerns severely limited the number of weapons dropped in the first two weeks making every strike all the more important.³⁷

How should the resources of the force be applied to accomplish the desired sequence of actions? (means)

Tom Friedman of the New York Times called for a "merciless war" from the air: "Every power grid, water pipe, bridge, road and war-related factory has to be targeted...the stakes have to be very clear [to the Serbs]. Every week you ravage Kosovo is another decade we will set your country back by pulverizing it. You want 1950? We can do 1950. You want 1389? We can do 1389."³⁸

The statement from Tom Friedman highlights a debate on what to target and how destructive strikes should be against civilian infrastructure. Most of the weapons used for OAF were precision guided munitions (PGMs), making an effort to avoid collateral

damage.³⁹ "The war in Kosovo showed that minimizing collateral damage has become a critical new aspect of modern war."⁴⁰ It also made selecting targets very difficult.

The target selection process undoubtedly began with a discussion of the center of gravity (COG) for both Serbia and NATO. NATO's source of power was the alliance, which made it possible to execute the missions.⁴¹ For example, Italy's support was required for the use of its 17 airfields. Without them, air attacks could not have taken place.⁴² To protect the alliance, meant low collateral damage and subsequent acceptance (not necessarily support) by member countries' citizenry. Serbia's COG was a topic of debate even between the CINC (Gen. Clark) and the JFAC (Lt. Gen. Short) and, upon review, failed to stop the killing for 78 days.⁴³

"You can't do everything with standoff weapons...We never neutralized the Integrated Air Defense System (IADS); we weren't any safer on day 78 than we were on day one," he said. "The doctrine calls for neutralizing the IADS before taking on the targets that count (such as roads, bridges and headquarters structures). If we followed that doctrine to the letter we would have pounded nothing but IADS for 78 days."⁴⁴

Doctrine was abandoned in an effort to stop the killing. Pilots were placed at increased risk of having to avoid IADS and/or defend against them in order to hit the targets that might generate the quickest positive results.⁴⁵ To accomplish this, Lt. Gen. Short thought Serbia's COG was the target set around Belgrade. This set included Milosevic, his inner circle of leaders, homes, command and control assets, Special Police headquarters, bridges, fuel depots, and government buildings.⁴⁶ Gen. Clark, on the other hand, thought the troops and tanks in Kosovo were the targets of interest.⁴⁷ Who was right or wrong?

If any strategy had a chance of achieving the objectives, it was one pursued by Lt. Gen. Short. Not hitting the IADS was the correct course of action – time was critical. Active IADS did not allow low altitude bombing, which is required for close-air-support

tank and troop targeting. The only time that troop targeting was remotely successful was toward the end of the conflict when the KLA forced Serbian forces into the open for B-52 bombs.⁴⁸

What is the likely cost or risk in performing that sequence of actions?

The risk with Gen. Clark's tactical bombing plan was the high likelihood of ineffectively targeting and striking innocent civilians. The risk with Lt. Gen. Short's plan was potentially having no affect upon Milosevic and striking innocent civilians and infrastructure. The yet to be compiled record for damage will likely reveal that both risks were realized. Still, these risks raise interesting questions about the use of air power and missile in combat.⁴⁹

The first question concerns the intended effect of the damage. Attacks on fuel depots and LOCs have been useful in the past, however, it is difficult to determine if the consequences are having any effect.⁵⁰ Moreover, comments by military leaders have led some to believe that civilians and their quality of life is the unstated target.⁵¹ Is air power in this sense designed to affect the political leader or the innocent civilians of the country in an attempt to change their opinion of the leader and thus throw him out of power?

"If you wake up in the morning and you have no power to your house and no gas to your stove and the bridge you take to work is down and will be lying in the Danube for the next 20 years, then you begin to ask, 'Hey, Sloba, what's this all about? How much more of this do we have to withstand?' And at some point you make the transition from applauding Serb machismo against the world to thinking what your country is going to look like if this continues."⁵² General Short

Military commanders, to limit media misinterpretation, should avoid statements such as Lt. Gen. Short's especially since there will undoubtedly be collateral damage – it is difficult to avoid. During offensive operations with

questionable objectives related to US national security, public opinion will have a significant impact on future operations.

The basic procedure for the conduct of a "just war" is to spare noncombatants. NATO was scrupulous about trying to avoid direct attacks on civilians. But by striking infrastructure in Serbia, including electrical grids and water facilities, the alliance did considerable indirect damage to the civilian population there. Besides harming those whom NATO'S political leaders had proclaimed innocent of the crimes committed in Kosovo-for which they blamed Milosevic, not the Serb people-these strikes violated Article 14 of the 1977 Protocol to the 1949 Geneva Convention, which bars attacks on "objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population."⁵³

This statement is an indication of the types of questions that must be answered in the international community.

There is a constant balancing act between force protection of pilots and protection of the innocent civilians. The debate will likely continue and become even more prevalent as increased air-and-missile forces are used. The US requires a well thought out targeting plan and must be prepared to deal with the "fog of war" concerning strategic bomb and missile attacks.

What brought an end to the conflict?

Not surprisingly, Lt. Gen. Short believes it was the destruction of major targets in Belgrade and other major cities outside Kosovo that led to Milosevic's capitulation.⁵⁴ Gen. Clark had a different read, telling reporters that the conflict ended only when Milosevic realized that he faced an imminent ground invasion.⁵⁵ Britain's Lt. Gen. Sir Michael Jackson, the initial NATO commander in Kosovo, had yet a third opinion as to the key to victory-an opinion shared by some military and diplomatic observers. "The event of June 3 [when the Russians backed the West's position and urged Milosevic to surrender] was the single event that appeared to have the greatest significance in ending the war."⁵⁶ All the facts are not known yet for the actual cause of Milosevic's capitulation.

The reason for finally getting the Yugoslav Army out of Kosovo is almost an insignificant issue, since the ethnic cleansing was allowed to continue for 78 days. NATO planes were slow to affect Yugoslav troops. Serbian police expelled more than 800,000 ethnic Albanians from Kosovo and displaced nearly 600,000 others within the province, according to UN and State Department figures respectively.⁵⁷ By the time allied planes began striking enemy forces in earnest, Milosevic's campaign of forced deportation was nearly complete.⁵⁸ The author prefers the views of General John Jumper who had a unique perspective. He stated, "Air power did not produce a victory. It produced a [temporary] success... The victory will only come when the very difficult political situation in that part of the world is brought to some reasonable resolution. In this regard, history is not on our side."⁵⁹

Consequences of the Air-and-Missile Campaign

Because of the potential for fewer US casualties and the use of technologically advanced weapons, air power is becoming quintessentially an American form of war; it uses our advantages of mobility and high technology to overwhelm the enemy without spilling too much blood, especially American blood. This last point cannot be overemphasized: excluding any imminent threat to our survival, no American government is likely to undertake military operations that promise more than the handful of casualties we suffered in the Gulf.⁶⁰

There are significant issues associated with air-and-missile warfare including cost, availability of PGM weapons, collateral damage, and the inability to stop isolated troops on the ground. The cost issue has two variables: the cost of avoiding civilian casualties and the cost of weapons verses the target. A cruise missile fired from a ship or submarine runs about \$1 million apiece, and their heftier cousins launched off B-52's cost twice that. Some of these were used against \$10,000 targets.⁶¹ If this is the new way of conducting war, it is going to get expensive quick, especially since the US nearly depleted its supply of cruise missiles in the first 6 days of OAF.⁶² These expensive

PGMs were, for the most part, supposed to limit collateral damage. Yet, the most exact weapons in the world somehow could not keep the US from adversely affecting two of its most important interests, relations with China and Russia -- the only two countries in the world that aim nuclear weapons at the United States.⁶³ Lastly, NATO could not hit the Yugoslav Army with any great effect, and attempting to, thereby causing several embarrassing collateral damage episodes.⁶⁴

Implications upon future operations

"The Air Force has been crowing for some time that in Kosovo for the very first time, modern air power won a war single-handed... If indeed the Air Force can now triumph in war single-handedly, then presumably it deserves the lion's share of the scarce defense funds."⁶⁵

The argument over the very old question of whether air power, unaided, is a way of winning wars will likely become bitter given the skyrocketing price of individual weapons and platforms. Nevertheless, the outcome of the air-and-missile war in Kosovo provides a strong argument for the funding of combat ready forces with major advances in the technology of air-and-missile combat. It is not, however, a reason for arguing for major tradeoffs in the funding given to air-and-missile power relative to other combat elements, or for redefining "jointness."⁶⁶ The US military should continue under its current structure, while ensuring that precision strikes from every combat platform limit collateral damage and risk to civilians.

Conclusions

US doctrine is in a state of fluctuation, with offensively minded "humanitarian wars" likely in the future. Furthermore, the military doctrine of decisive force will be difficult to achieve given the future of alliances, coalitions, and political oversight. Increasingly, air power is an attractive military option to politicians because the loss of

friendly forces is limited, and there is some potential to achieve limited objectives. Moreover, air-and-missile attacks that are designed for "shock and awe" are more difficult to obtain especially when an incremental approach is used. Ultimately, air power is a double-edged sword that inherently has lower risk for US troops, but in some respects has increased risk for civilians.

The operational art "four questions," applied to OAF, indicates a flawed strategy from the start with poor planning in the "what-if" category. Moreover, discussions between the top generals commanding OAF, concerning COG, highlight a shortfall in targeting strategy. Lastly, the desired effect combined with the expected outcome appears to have been overly optimistic at the highest levels of US government. Given the current level of political oversight, it is possible that being intellectually adept at operational art may only serve to enlighten military leaders that the course of action they are constrained to follow is completely futile.

Notes

¹ Doug Thompson, "Military strategists admit failure in "unwinnable" Kosovo air war," 2-3. <<http://www.capitolhillblue.com/March1999/0331199/cruisemissiles033199.htm>> (6 Jan 2000)

² <alert@stratfor.com> "Kosovo: The United States Looking for an Exit." 6 February 2000. STRATFOR.COM's Weekly Global Intelligence Update (7 February 2000)

³ "Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing," Statement of General Klaus Naumann German Army, Former Chairman NATO Military Committee, 3 November 1999. <www.usia.gov/admin/013/nea406.htm> (7 February 2000)

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Michael Mandelbaum, "A perfect failure," Foreign Affairs, Sep/Oct 1999, 1:2-8. "Retired Gen. Colin Powell joined the chorus of those who said the war can't be won in the air, telling a audience at Virginia Tech Tuesday the U. S. and NATO will have to use ground troops if they want to win. And the Pentagon is reluctantly admitting that things haven't gone as expected. "I think right now it is difficult to say that we have prevented one act of brutality at this stage," Defense Department spokesman Kenneth Bacon told reporters Tuesday."

⁶ Rowan Scarborough, "US and NATO Objectives and Interests in Kosovo," The Washington Times, 2 April 1999. <http://www.eaglesup.com/wkend_april2.html> (7 February 2000) General Clark, the supreme allied commander, changed the stated mission goals with respect to stopping the killing one-week after the bombing started. NATO shifted its policy objectives again Thursday for declaring victory over Yugoslavia, saying it can bomb the Serbian army into submission before it can empty Kosovo of all ethnic Albanians. The objective stated by Gen. Wesley Clark came a week after he said the mission's goal was to "destroy" Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic's army and leave it unable to threaten the 2 million Kosovar Albanians.

⁷ John A. Warden, "Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century," Reprinted publication from The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War, Translated by Richard H. Shultz, and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 55.

⁸ Ibid., 59.

⁹ Ken Campbell, "The Weinberger-Powell Doctrine and The Suppression of Genocide," A talk at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, 24 March 1999, 3. <<http://ksgwww.harvard.edu/cchrp/kcampbell.htm>> (7 February 2000) The first applied in a way that kept force from being used, and I would point out Central America when the "enthusiasts" in the basement of the White House wanted to use military force directly in Central America in the early 1980s. There was momentum to use US ground forces in Central America, they didn't think at that time that the contras could do it, they never did think that the contras by themselves could do it. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff threw up roadblocks, because they insisted these conditions be met. Principally, what was referred to in the early 1970s as the "essential domino," public opinion. And I think that the results, whether any of us agree, the results to the Pentagon, to the chairman and joint chiefs of staff, demonstrated that the application of this doctrine, following this doctrine can provide clear and overwhelming victory.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ L. Edgar Prina, "Air war Kosovo: Lessons learned and relearned," Sea Power, Nov 1999, 47-50. Richard Holbrooke, in his book, To End a War, talks about the "dark clouds" that hung over the Pentagon regarding Vietnam and Mogadishu. He came up with this name, "Vietmalia"; the "Vietmalia Syndrome," which deeply affected America's Bosnia policy.

¹² Michael Mandelbaum, "A perfect failure," Foreign Affairs, New York, Sep/Oct 1999, 2-8.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Hunter Keeter, "Precision Capability may Spur Revision in Airpower Doctrine," Defense Daily, 21 October 1999, 1.

¹⁵ "US and NATO Objectives and Interests in Kosovo," Fact Sheet released by the US Department of State, 26 March 1999, 1-2. <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/fs_990326_ksvobjectives.html> (7 February 2000)

Hence, the reasons given by the President yesterday [March 23] for doing something -- that the integrity of NATO was at stake. The credibility of NATO was at stake. The very same reason he gave for responding with substantial and decisive force in Bosnia in September of 1995.

¹⁶ Ken Campbell, "The Weinberger-Powell Doctrine and The Suppression of Genocide," A talk at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, 24 March 1999, 3. <<http://ksgwww.harvard.edu/cchrrp/kcampbell.htm>> (7 February 2000)

I'm assuming that genocide is the kind of crime that requires suppressive force, decisive force, and quick application of force. I would argue to you that genocide is the kind of crime that inherently requires the quick and decisive application of force because, first of all, it is premeditated. It is planned, it is systematic, and it is malicious. It is different from manslaughter -- it's like Murder One is different from manslaughter. It is not a war crime -- we have to define what it isn't -- it is not a war crime, it has got a separate category all the way back to the 1948 Genocide Convention. It is considered the most, the worst crime in international society.

¹⁷ Paul Starr, "The choice in Kosovo," The American Prospect, Princeton, Jul/Aug 1999, 6-9.

"So much doubt swirls about the strategic decisions made by NATO and the Clinton administration that it is easy to forget the root question: Was it right in the first place for NATO and the United States to try to stop Serbia from its campaign of ethnic cleansing?"

¹⁸ US Naval War College, Joint Maritime Operations Syllabus, Ops Session 4, 1999-2000, 4.

¹⁹ "US and NATO Objectives and Interests in Kosovo," Fact Sheet released by the US Department of State, Washington, DC, 26 March 1999.

<http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/fs_990326_ksvobjectives.html> (7 February 2000)

²⁰ ²⁰ "US and NATO Objectives and Interests in Kosovo," Fact Sheet released by the US Department of State, Washington, DC, 26 March 1999.

<http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/fs_990326_ksvobjectives.html> (7 February 2000)

²¹ "Letter to Cohen Says Only Ground Troops Would Guarantee Fulfillment of NATO's Objectives in Kosovo," Newsweek, 16 May 1999 <<http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a373eefe05311.htm>> (7 February 2000)

²² Timothy A. Vuono, "A commander's estimate of the situation: Kosovo & the Southern Balkans," (Unpublished Research Paper, US Naval War College, Newport, RI: 1999), 2-19.

²³ "NATO and Milosevic in deadly "race" to achieve objectives: diplomats," 1 April 1999

<<http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a370407720a5e.htm>> (7 February 2000)

²⁴ "Letter to Cohen Says Only Ground Troops Would Guarantee Fulfillment of NATO's Objectives in Kosovo," Newsweek, 16 May 1999 <<http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a373eefe05311.htm>> (7 February 2000)

²⁵ Ken Campbell, "The Weinberger-Powell Doctrine and The Suppression of Genocide," A talk at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, 24 March 1999, 3. <<http://ksgwww.harvard.edu/cchrp/kcampbell.htm>> (7 February 2000)

²⁶ Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services. Lessons Learned From Military Operations and Relief Efforts in Kosovo. Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, 106th Congress, 1st sess., 21 Oct 1999. General Clark Comments.

"...I feel strongly that, once the threshold is crossed and you are going to use force, that force has to be as decisive as possible in attaining your military objectives."

²⁷ Richard A. Hand, "The Truman-MacArthur dispute," (Unpublished Research Paper, US Naval War College, Newport, RI: 1999)

²⁸ Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services. Lessons Learned From Military Operations and Relief Efforts in Kosovo. Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, 106th Congress, 1st sess., 21 Oct 1999. Statements by Senator Warner.

²⁹ "NATO and Milosevic in deadly "race" to achieve objectives: diplomats," 1 April 1999 <<http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a370407720a5e.htm>> (7 February 2000)

³⁰ L. Edgar Prina, "Air war Kosovo: Lessons learned and relearned," Sea Power, Nov 1999, 47-50. There is general agreement among observers that President Clinton's decision to rule out, from the outset, the commitment of US ground troops for an invasion of Kosovo was a huge relief to Milosevic and his campaign of ethnic cleansing. NATO was willing to take the first step in commencing an air war, but was unprepared initially to take -or seriously consider-the last step that might be necessary to achieve its war aims. This was a serious strategic shortcoming.

³¹ "Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing," Statement of General Klaus Naumann German Army, Former Chairman NATO Military Committee, 3 November 1999. <www.usia.gov/admin/013/nea406.htm> (7 February 2000)

³² Ibid. The OPLANs for OAF had been developed in the fall of 1998. Both ingredients the Limited Air Response and the Phased Air Operation had been designated to meet the objective to bring Milosevic back to the negotiation table. When we began the air strikes, however, we faced an opponent who had accepted war were as the NATO nations had accepted an operation.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid. "I also have to say that the gradualism of the air campaign was much more caused by the political objective which soon saw revision against the background of the dynamically unfolding situation than it was influenced by politically motivated interference."

³⁵ Anthony H. Cordesman, "The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile War in Kosovo," The Executive Summary, 20 July 1999, <<http://www.csis.org/kosovo/Lessons.html>> (7 February 2000)

³⁶ Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services. Lessons Learned From Military Operations and Relief Efforts in Kosovo. Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, 106th Congress, 1st sess., 21 Oct 1999. Comments by Senator Levin.

³⁷ Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services. Lessons Learned From Military Operations and Relief Efforts in Kosovo. Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, 106th Congress, 1st sess., 21 Oct 1999. Statements by Major General Short.

³⁸ Norman Friedman, "Was Kosovo the future?," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, January 2000, 2.

³⁹ Anthony H. Cordesman, "The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile War in Kosovo," The Executive Summary, 20 July 1999, <<http://www.csis.org/kosovo/Lessons.html>> (7 February 2000)

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ "Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing," Statement of General Klaus Naumann German Army, Former Chairman NATO Military Committee, 3 November 1999. <www.usia.gov/admin/013/nea406.htm> (7 February 2000)

⁴² Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services. Lessons Learned From Military Operations and Relief Efforts in Kosovo. Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, 106th Congress, 1st sess., 21 Oct 1999. Statements by Senator Warner.

⁴³ Ibid.,. Statements by Major General Short.

⁴⁴ Hunter Keeter, "Precision Capability may Spur Revision in Airpower Doctrine," Defense Daily 204, Potomac, 21 October 1999, 1. Comments by Admiral Murphy.

⁴⁵ Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services. Lessons Learned From Military Operations and Relief Efforts in Kosovo. Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, 106th Congress, 1st sess., 21 Oct 1999. Statements by Major General Short.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Anthony H. Cordesman, "The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile War in Kosovo," The Executive Summary, 20 July 1999, <<http://www.csis.org/kosovo/Lessons.html>> (7 February 2000)

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.,. He states that NATO encountered a classic problem in strategic bombing. It could speculate on the importance of given targets to Serbia, but had no reliable way of knowing their importance. As a result, it tended to bomb by category and judge its success largely by perceived damage to physical facilities, rather than any clear insights into enemy perceptions and behavior.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ "U.N. Court Examines NATO's Yugoslavia War," New York Times, 29 Dec 1999, A5. The chief war crimes prosecutor for the United Nations is reviewing the conduct of NATO pilots and their commanders during last spring's 78 day bombing campaign against Yugoslavia, her spokesman said today. The staff of the prosecutor Carla Del Ponte, compiled a report on the air strikes at the urging of several "interested parties," including a group of Russian lawmakers and a Canadian law professor, said the spokesman, Paul Risley.

⁵² William Drozdiak, "Commander of Air War Says Kosovo Victory Near," Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs News Release, 25 May 1999, 2. <<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupb/bbl/archive/1999/05/254051999-01.htm>> (1 Dec 1999)

⁵³ Hunter Keeter, "Precision Capability may Spur Revision in Airpower Doctrine," Defense Daily 204, Potomac, 21 October 1999, 1.

⁵⁴ L. Edgar Prina, "Air war Kosovo: Lessons learned and relearned," Sea Power, Nov 1999, 47-50.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ William Drozdiak, "Commander of Air War Says Kosovo Victory Near," Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs News Release, 25 May 1999, 3.
<<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupb/bbl/archive/1999/05/254051999-01.htm>> (1 Dec 1999)

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Cory Lancaster, "AF General Details Lessons Learned From Airstrikes," 16 October 1999, 1.
<http://delphi-s.dia.smil/admin/earlybird/991018/s19991018af.htm> (28 January 2000)

⁶⁰ John A. Warden, "Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century," Reprinted publication from The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War, Richard H. Shultz, and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 61-62.

⁶¹ Eric Schmitt, "It Costs a Lot More To Kill Fewer People," New York Times, 2 May 1999, 5.

⁶² Doug Thompson, "Military strategists admit failure in "unwinnable" Kosovo air war," 2-3.
<<http://www.capitolhillblue.com/March1999/0331199/cruisemissiles033199.htm>> (6 Jan 2000)
Started running out of cruise missiles: down to 120 missiles after 6 days with conventional warheads and there is no assembly line to replace. The atrocities have increased and military planners are now admitting the war may be based on an "unwinnable" strategy.

⁶³ Michael Mandelbaum, "A perfect failure," Foreign Affairs v.78 i.5, New York, Sep/Oct 1999, 2-8. The Chinese leaders professed to be unconvinced by the American explanation for the accidental attack on their embassy. Whatever they thought, the attack was a political windfall for their regime. It diverted attention from the tenth anniversary of the bloody crackdown on the student rallies in Beijing and other cities and channeled against the United States popular sentiment that might otherwise have been directed toward the perpetrators of oppression. It was thus a double setback for American China policy: it strengthened the elements in the Chinese government least favored by Washington, and it stirred anti-American sentiment in some sectors of the Chinese population.

As for Russia, the war accelerated the deterioration in its relations with the West that the ill advised decision to extend NATO membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic had set in motion. In return for permitting a reunited Germany within NATO, Mikhail Gorbachev was promised that the Western military alliance would not expand further eastward. The Clinton administration broke that promise but offered three compensating assurances: that NATO was transforming itself into a largely political organization for the promotion of democracy and free markets; that insofar as NATO retained a military mission, it was strictly a defensive one; and that Russia, although not a NATO member, would be a full participant in European security affairs. The war in Yugoslavia gave the lie to all three: NATO initiated a war against a sovereign state that had attacked none of its members, a war to which Russia objected but that Moscow could not prevent. Whereas NATO expansion had angered the Russian political class, the bombing of Serbia by all accounts triggered widespread outrage in the Russian public. Thus the sudden postwar occupation of the airport at Pristina, the capital of Kosovo, by Zoo Russian troops evoked enthusiastic approval in Russia and signaled a shift in the politics of Russian foreign policy in a nationalist direction.

⁶⁴ Doug Thompson, "Military strategists admit failure in "unwinnable" Kosovo air war," 2-3.
<<http://www.capitolhillblue.com/March1999/0331199/cruisemissiles033199.htm>> (6 Jan 2000)
Even when the skies cleared, NATO pinpoint accuracy didn't stop the 40,000-strong Yugoslav Army and special police from purging most of the 1.8 million ethnic Albanians from Kosovo, or from avoiding gruesome civilian casualties, like the two convoys and a passenger train that were accidentally blasted to bits by allied warplanes. On top of that, NATO's political leaders have restricted the targets pilots could hit and the tactics they use to hit them. Low-flying ground-attack planes like the A-10, ideal for blasting tanks, have flown few bombing runs for fear they are still too vulnerable to Yugoslav missiles. Other high-

flying jets have picked up many of those missions, but it's difficult to distinguish a farmer's truck from armored infantry vehicle at 20,000 feet.

⁶⁵ Norman Friedman, "Was Kosovo the future?," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, January 2000, 1.

⁶⁶ Anthony H. Cordesman, "The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile War in Kosovo," The Executive Summary, 20 July 1999, <<http://www.csis.org/kosovo/Lessons.html>> (7 February 2000)

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